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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

STATE v. ALLEN: FELONY-MURDER DOES NOT EXIST
WHEN THE FELONY OCCURS AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT TO
THE ACT CAUSING DEATH
By: Emily King Watkins

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that in order to sustain a
conviction for felony-murder, the intent to commit the underlying
felony must exist prior to or concurrent with the performance of the
act causing the death of the victim. State v. Allen, 387 Md. 389, 875
A.2d 724 (2005). In so holding, the Court of Appeals aligned itself
with the majority view expressed by the courts of this country. /d.
On the evening of October 23, 2001, Jeffery Edward Allen
("Allen") was in northwest Washington, D.C., in a neighborhood
nicknamed "The Stroll" that was known as a meeting place for
homosexual men. A car pulled up next to Allen and the vehicle's
occupants asked him if he wished to go with them to La Plata,
Maryland. Allen agreed and got into the car.
John Butler ("Butler"), the driver, dropped off all ofthe passengers,
except for Allen, at a residence in La Plata. Butler agreed to meet one
of the departing passengers at 9:00 the following morning to attend a
funeral. Butler and Allen then proceeded to Butler's house in Port
Tobacco. The two men engaged in consensual sex and fell asleep on
Butler's bed.
Allen awoke around 9:00 the next morning and was anxious to
leave Butler's house. He asked Butler if he still intended to go to the
funeral, and Butler said he did not. Allen was upset, and Butler told
Allen to "chill out" and have a beer. Allen became more agitated
when he opened the refrigerator and saw a live rat inside. Allen asked
Butler to drive him back to Washington, D.C., but Butler remained in
bed.
Finally, Allen figured that if he told Butler he was going to drive
himself back to Washington, D.C., Butler would get out of bed.
According to Allen's written statement to the police, he picked up the
keys and announced that he was driving himself back. Butler told him
to wait a minute and Allen heard Butler rummaging in the room.
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Allen started to walk back towards the room and saw Butler coming at
him with a blanket draped over his arm. Allen grabbed a knife from
the top of the refrigerator for protection. Allen pushed Butler back
into the room where they struggled. Butler fell onto the bed, but
continued to come at Allen, so Allen stabbed Butler repeatedly. Allen
ran toward the telephone, but it did not work, so he grabbed Butler's
car keys and drove off. Allen eventually made his way to a phone and
called 911 to report the incident.
Butler died from the stabbing, and Allen was indicted by the Grand
Jury for Charles County. Allen was then tried before a jury in the
Circuit Court for Charles County on several charges stemming from
Butler's killing and the subsequent robbery of Butler's car. Allen was
convicted of first degree felony-murder, second degree murder,
robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon, robbery, theft, and two
weapons counts. The jury acquitted Allen of first degree premeditated
murder.
Allen appealed this decision to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, arguing that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury,
which affected his robbery and first degree felony-murder convictions.
The trial court's jury instruction explained that the requisite
connection between the use of force and intent to deprive the victim of
property was satisfied as long as the two were "part and parcel of the
same occurrence which involved the death." The Court of Special
Appeals reversed Allen's first degree felony-murder conviction,
holding that a robbery that occurs after the killing cannot support a
conviction for felony murder. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted the state's petition for writ of certiorari to determine whether
the jury instruction correctly stated the law of Maryland on felonymurder.
The Court of Appeals found that the jury instruction was incorrect
and that "a defendant is guilty of first-degree felony-murder only if the
defendant's intent to commit the predicate enumerated felony arises
prior to, or concurrent with, the conduct resulting in death." !d. at 396,
875 A.2d at 728. In making its decision, the court looked to MD.
CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 2-201 (2002 & Supp. 2004), for the
definition of first degree felony-murder. Allen, 387 Md. at 396, 875
A.2d at 728. The statute provides that, "[a] murder is in the first
degree if it is . . . committed in the perpetration of or an attempt to
perpetrate ... robbery under § 3-402 or § 3-403 of this article." !d. at
397, 875 A.2d at 729. Based upon this statute, the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that "a murder was 'committed in the
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perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate' a robbery or attempted
robbery," for a conviction of first degree felony-murder to stand. !d.
The Court looked to cases throughout the country, and it
determined that the majority of jurisdictions have held that to sustain a
felony-murder conviction, the felony cannot be an afterthought to the
killing. !d. at 398, 875 A.2d at 729. This interpretation of the felonymurder rule is known as the "narrow view." !d. at 401, 875 A.2d at
731. The felony-murder rule was originally developed to deter
dangerous and violent felonies, by punishing the perpetrator with first
degree murder instead of a lesser offense if he unintentionally killed
his victim during the commission of a felony. !d. at 398, 875 A.2d at
729. The Court found there is no basis for the deterrent if the accused
did not intend to commit the felony at the time of the killing. !d. at
400, 875 A.2d at 731.
The primary theoretical foundation of the rule is also compromised
if the felony is committed after the victim is dead. !d. at 402, 875
A.2d at 732. The crime of murder requires a malicious mens rea. !d.
"Under the felony-murder rule, the malice involved in the underlying
felony is permitted to stand in the place of the malice that would
otherwise be required with respect to the killing." !d. The Court
reasoned that if there is no underlying felony, there is no malicious
mens rea to transfer to the homicide. !d. at 403, 875 A.2d at 732.
The Court of Appeals likewise found that a minority of
jurisdictions adhere to the view that if there is a continuity of action
between the killing and the felony, then the felony-murder rule
applies, even if the felony occurs after the killing. Id. at 399, 875 A.2d
at 730. These courts reason that the act causing the death is part and
parcel of the same action as the felony. This interpretation of the rule
is known as the "broad view." !d.
The Court of Special Appeals subscribed to the "broad view" in
Higginbotham v. State, 104 Md. App. 145, 655 A.2d 1282 (1995). !d.
at 399, 875 A.2d at 730. The Court of Appeals stated its disapproval
of the holding in Higginbotham in Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576, 755
A.2d 1088 (2000), saying that the lower court stretched the scope of
the felony-murder rule too far. Id. at 400, 875 A.2d at 730. Here the
Court of Appeals overruled Higginbotham by applying the "narrow
view" of the felony-murder doctrine, which is followed by the
majority of jurisdictions.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that in order to sustain a
conviction for felony-murder, the intent to commit the underlying
felony must exist prior to or concurrent with the performance of the
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act causing the death of the victim. This holding conforms to the
definition of first degree felony-murder in MD. CODE ANN. CRIM.
LAW § 2-201 (2002 & Supp. 2004), and the "narrow view" held by
the majority of courts in this country. The Court believes that the
felony-murder rule serves as an appropriate deterrent for a person who
is planning to commit a dangerous felony, but that the rule should not
be a "catch-all" means to convict a defendant of first degree murder.
The Court's holding resolves any misunderstanding of the felonymurder doctrine by the lower courts in the State of Maryland by
clarifying the appropriate interpretation of the rule. Future defendants,
who commit both a felony and a murder in the same act in the State of
Maryland, will be convicted of felony-murder only if they formed the
intent to commit the underlying felony prior to or concurrent with the
murder of the victim, not if the felony was an afterthought to the
murder.

